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1. Safety issues with the South African Pebble Bed Modular Reactor: When were the 
issues apparent? 
In July 2008, the German Jülich nuclear research centre published a report entitled ‘A safety re-
evaluation of the AVR pebble bed reactor operation and its consequences for future HTR concepts.’ 
It concluded: ‘pebble bed HTRs require additional safety related R&D effort and updating of safety 
analyses before construction.’ 
The fundamental reason for these conclusions is that it has, with this study, become clear that the 
temperatures that were experienced in the German prototype plant, the AVR, were more than 200 
degrees C above those anticipated in the design. This led to massive contamination of the plant as 
well as major safety issues. These high temperatures have been known about since before 1990 and 
cannot be explained, as had been previously assumed, by inadequate fuel quality only. 
Given that this research was produced by the research institute that pioneered high temperature 
reactor work in Germany (the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor is a type of high temperature reactor) 
and that the AVR was designed by the Jülich Centre, these findings cannot be ignored. If they are 
valid, it is inconceivable that the PBMR programme could proceed in anything like its present form 
and the earliest date for commercial availability of this technology is now far in the future. 
The PBMR programme has been promoted and funded primarily through South African 
government-owned bodies, such as the nationally-owned electric utility, Eskom, by the company set 
up to develop the technology, PBMR Co, the government’s Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) and by government departments directly. The question therefore arises, who knew what and 
when about this potential problem? 
2. Historical background and costs incurred 
High temperature gas-cooled reactors have been under development in Germany, primarily through 
the German government’s Jülich research centre, since the 1950s. Jülich was set up in 1956 by the 
North-Rhine Westphalia State and in 1967 became a limited company. The shareholders are the 
German state (90 per cent) and the North Rhine Westphalia government (10 per cent). A prototype 
plant at Jülich, AVR, which produced 15MW of electrical power, was ordered in 1959 and operated 
from 1967-88. This was followed up by a demonstration plant, THTR-300 (300MW), which 
operated went critical in 1983 but last generated power in 1988 and was formally closed in 1989. 
While the AVR was generally portrayed as highly successful, the operating record of the THTR-
300 was poor. It was closed after only a few years of highly erratic operation because of difficulties 
obtaining funding for its continued operation. However, public opposition and technical issues 
would have made its continued operation problematic. The technical problems were such that later 
design concepts were based on the AVR rather than THTR-300. Subsequently, the THTR-300 
designer, ABB, joined forces with Siemens, which had also designed a similar size plant producing 
a new design. The joint venture company, HTR, promoted this design for a couple of years before 
giving up active promotion of it although continuing to sell technology licenses, including to South 
Africa and China. 
The ownership of HTR has changed as its original owners have been subject to merger and takeover 
activity. ABB was bought in the late-1990s by the UK government owned nuclear technology 
company, BNFL, which merged it with the Westinghouse nuclear business which it bought at about 
the same time. In 2006, it spun off the Westinghouse division and sold it to the Japanese company 
Toshiba. Siemens’ nuclear division was merged with that of the French company, Framatome to 
form Areva NP, owned 66 per cent by the French parent company, Areva and Siemens (34 per 
cent). 
The design was taken up in three main countries, China, Russia and South Africa, in the latter case 
from 1993 onwards in the publicly owned electric utility, Eskom. HTR co-operated with Eskom 
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who produced a design which, unlike its predecessors, was expected to generate electricity using a 
gas turbine driven by the helium coolant gas rather than via a heat exchanger and a conventional 
steam circuit. In 1998, these efforts were made public and it was then forecast by Eskom that 
following completion and operation of a demonstration plant, commercial orders would be possible 
from 2004 onwards. In 1999, Eskom took a license from HTR for pebble bed technology. In 2000, a 
new company, PBMR Co, was set up to complete a feasibility phase. This company was 100 per 
cent owned by Eskom, but other investors were brought in to fund this phase. This funding would 
allow them to take up shares in a successor company to PBMR Co that would complete a 
demonstration phase in which a demonstration plant would be built and operated, and commercial 
sales would be placed. 
The original design has been uprated in its power output from 110MW when the project was made 
public in 1998 to 165MW, although still retaining essentially the same physical dimensions as the 
original 110MW design to improve the economics through scale economies. 
The investors in this company varied but the main ones were: British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), the 
UK government owned nuclear technology company that promised 22.5 per cent of the funding for 
the feasibility phase in 2000; Exelon, a US electric utility that took 12.5 per cent in 2000; and the 
South African government’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which took 25 per cent, 
also in 2000. 10 per cent was reserved for an Economic Empowerment Entity with Eskom expected 
to take the remaining 30 per cent. Things turned out very differently. Exelon withdrew in April 
2002 and while it did pay some of the money promised, it is not clear whether it fulfilled the full 
12.5 per cent quota. BNFL ran into financial problems in 2002 and stopped funding in 2003 paying 
only 15 per cent of the cost of the feasibility phase. IDC, unreported at the time, reduced its stake to 
13 per cent in 2002. The Economic Empowerment Entity stake was never taken up so Eskom’s 
contribution was 60 per cent, rather than the 30 per cent planned. South African public money, 
which should have funded 55 per cent of this phase actually funded about 75 per cent. 
There was no official announcement of when the feasibility phase actually finished but it appears to 
have been in March 2004, by which time, PBMR Co stated that R1.4bn had been spent, of which it 
seems about R1bn had come from South African public money. By July 2008, the successor 
company had still not been set up and no partners had agreed to fund the demonstration phase. It 
appears that the running costs of PBMR Co from March 2004 onwards, still 100 per cent owned by 
Eskom, were met by South African public money, mostly from direct government grants. There is 
no definitive information on what the running costs for PBMR Co are. Terblanche
1
, chair of PBMR 
Co, indicated in 2004 that monthly costs were ‘a lot more than’ R50m. In February 2005, when the 
government’s budget was announced, the government support for PBMR in that year was R600m. 
So as a minimum, if we take R50m as the monthly running cost of PBMR Co, a further R2.5bn has 
probably been spent from March 2004 to end of June 2008, making a total of about R4bn, of which 
R3.5bn is South African public money. 
A number of contracts have also been placed. For example, by December 2007, four contracts had 
been signed with the German fuel company, Nukem and contracts had been signed with another 
German company, SGL Carbon for supply of graphite. The value of these contracts has not been 
published. The largest contract is probably with Spain's Equipos Nucleares S.A. which has a 
contract worth a total of R312m for design and delivery of components for the plant's main power 
system pressure boundary, including the pressure vessel. No definitive list of the contracts that have 
been placed and their value exists. 
An international panel was set up in 2002 to review the PBMR but its findings were never made 
public. It was told in early 2002 that the final design would be sent to the South African National 
Nuclear Regulator within about 6 months. By May 2008, PBMR Co was saying that the design was 
still 6 months away from completion. Numerous target dates for setting up the new PBMR Co with 
                                                   
1
 Financial Mail, March 26, 2004, p 14. 
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its new investors have come and gone. Most recently, in April 2008, the Public Enterprises 
Minister, Alec Erwin, claimed the new company would be launched in May 2008, but this date 
again passed with no action. There have also been constant reports that new investors were eager to 
sign up to the demonstration phase, but these reports have also proved optimistic and no investors in 
the next phase have been confirmed beyond the South African government. 
As the delays with the PBMR mount and the power shortages in South Africa worsen, Eskom and 
the government seem now to be relying on orders for what they term ‘conventional’ nuclear power 
plants. These, the Westinghouse AP-1000 and the Areva EPR are plants similar in design to the 
plants that already exist at Koeberg in South Africa. No plants of these two designs have yet been 
completed. Eskom expects to place an order for 3600MW of capacity in 2008 with an option for a 
further 20000MW. The two companies bidding to supply these plants, Areva NP and 
Westinghouse, are the technology licensors for PBMR technology. 
3. What are the problems and when were they known about? 
The AVR has been portrayed to the South African public as an unqualified success. A German 
nuclear scientist, Peter Pohl, told the Carte Blanche programme: ‘what was achieved is unique, in 
temperature, in burn up, in reliability - it's just fantastic.’2 The Jülich report presents a different 
view. In 1978, there was a water ingress incident when water from the cooling circuits entered the 
reactor and this seems to have caused contamination of the soil at the site with highly radiotoxic 
Strontium-90. The result is that the reactor vessel has to be filled with concrete to immobilise the 
radioactive dust (see below) and to stabilize the vessel, and the 2000 tonne structure has had to be 
airlifted from the site to a remote store pending its decommissioning so the soil contamination at the 
site could be dealt with. Such a water ingress should not occur in the South African PBMR design 
because it uses a gas turbine rather than a steam turbine but the incident still raises very serious and 
potentially costly issues about the containment of the reactor. 
The AVR was only operated for about 4 reactor years at high gas temperatures of greater than 
900C. These are the temperatures that would be required for very high temperature reactors – the 
sort of plant that could be used, for example, to extract oil from tar sands or liquefy coal. PBMR Co 
has often alluded to the potential for the PBMR to operate at these higher temperatures to win this 
market and it has expressed interest in gaining US government money to develop such reactors. 
The President of the South African Institute of Nuclear Engineers, John Walmesley wrote in April 
2008: 
‘The reactor has the potential to operate at temperatures around 950°C. In other words, the helium gas 
that carries the heat out of the reactor exits the reactor pressure vessel at that temperature. This red-hot 
gas does not have to be used to make electricity. At that temperature it can be used to split water to make 
hydrogen, believed by many to be the fuel of the future. The Americans propose to build the Idaho "new 
generation nuclear plant" (NGNP), for which the PBMR is the front-runner, to show it can be done. To 
date, $1.1 billion has been allocated. The hot helium can also be used to heat coal hot enough to convert it 
to oil, a possible application of great interest to Sasol.’ 
In 1988, after a decision to close the plant had already been taken, it emerged that fuel temperatures 
in the AVR could have exceeded 1400C, more than 200 degrees higher than the expected maximum 
temperature. The regulatory permission to operate at gas temperatures of 950°C was withdrawn and 
the plant shut down permanently soon after. No mention is made of this withdrawal of the operation 
permit for 950°C in the 1991 final report on the AVR. This report states:
 3
 
‘At an average hot gas temperature of 950°C the highest fuel temperatures were around 1300°C and the 
highest surface temperatures were only slightly lower. However these values do not represent a serious 
load because of the full ceramic design of the fuel element.’ 
                                                   
2
 http://www.mnet.co.za/Mnet/Shows/carteblanche/story.asp?Id=3516  
3 AVR- Experimental High-Temperature Reactor. 21 Years of Successful Operation for a Future Energy Technology. 
Association of German Engineers (VDI) - The Society for Energy Technologies (Publ.) 1990. 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
26/04/2010  Page 5 of 6  
  
In contrast the AVR is still portrayed as a prototypic facility for VHTRs (Very High Temperature 
Reactors). Indeed the final report on AVR was entitled: ‘AVR-Experimental HTR: 21 years of 
successful operation for a future energy technology.’ 
The AVR reactor circuits are massively contaminated. The Jülich report states: 
‘the end of life contamination reached several percent of a single core inventory, which is some orders of 
magnitude more than precalculated and far more than in large LWRs. A major fraction of this 
contamination is bound on graphitic dust and thus partly mobile in depressurization accidents, which has 
to be considered in safety analyses of future reactors.’ 
In short, in any normal reactor, almost all the radioactivity at the plant is contained in the fuel with 
only a minute percentage due to contamination of the reactor itself. For AVR, it is several percent 
of the radioactive inventory. The consequences for decommissioning of AVR have not been the 
subject of much public debate in Germany. Some feel for the scale can be gained by a 2002 report 
which said that the expected decommissioning cost of AVR was $490m compared to the estimates 
of $20m that were given by the plant’s owners in the 1990s4. It seems highly likely that the estimate 
of $490m has grown substantially since 2002. 
The Jülich report shows that the assumption that the high temperatures were solely the result of 
poor quality fuel was incorrect and that other factors, as yet unknown, were involved. It was 
previously assumed by PBMR’s proponents that the issues raised by the high observed fuel 
temperature were not relevant to the South African PBMR because the fuel quality problems would 
not arise. According to PBMR Co, the outlet temperature would be 900C and the maximum fuel 
operating temperature should not exceed 1130C. If the large temperature variations observed in the 
AVR are a guide, the maximum fuel operating temperature is likely to be exceeded and the safety 
case does not stand. For example, it seems likely a gas-tight containment would be needed. The 
need for a containment (this keeps radioactivity within the reactor building in the event of an 
accident) has been a subject for discussion for some time and if it was needed, the additional cost 
for the PBMR would be prohibitive. 
The Jülich report suggests that a gas-tight containment should be included in any commercial 
pebble bed plants and that a large programme of R&D be conducted as well as a re-evaluation of 
the safety case. 
While the full extent of the problems is only now becoming clear, the high temperatures 
experienced at AVR were known about 20 years ago and it would seem fair to suggest that the 
German authorities should not have made the unsupported assumption that poor quality fuel was 
solely to blame, nor should they effectively have swept the issue under the carpet by not including 
any mention of the severe consequences of high temperatures in the final report on AVR. 
In terms of the South African involvement, the issue should have become clear by 2002 if not 
before. In 2000, the PBMR Co was joined by the US utility PECO (later it merged with another 
utility to become Exelon). This was a major step forward for PBMR Co as PECO promised to place 
ten orders for the plant (the only firm orders for the PBMR that have ever existed) and, even more 
important, agreed to pilot it through the safety regulatory process in the USA. If the PBMR was to 
be sold on international markets, regulatory approval by an authority with the prestige and 
credibility of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was essential. The process started in 
2001 and by the start of 2002, the NRC was asking significant questions on core temperatures.
5
 In 
April 2002, Exelon withdrew from PBMR Co. The process of regulatory approval continued for 
some time and was officially closed in September 2002
6
 but only after some very searching 
questions had been asked.  
                                                   
4
 Nucleonics Week 2002 ‘Decommissioning cost for German pebble bed reactor escalating’ July 4, 2002. 
5
 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/design-cert/pre-app-review/2002.html  
6
 http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/new-licensing-files/ml022530263.pdf  
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Exelon’s stated reasons for withdrawal were rather vague and it is not clear how far the issues that 
NRC raised contributed to this decision. John Rowe, the CEO of Exelon was quoted as saying: ‘the 
project was three years behind schedule and was "too speculative,"’7. He also said: "a detailed 
review that Corbin [McNeil, the joint CEO of Exelon] and I started late last summer yielded a 
recommendation from the people in charge of the project that ...[operation and testing was] three 
years further out than we had thought a year ago." 
Eskom and PBMR Co would certainly have been aware of the NRC’s questions. It subsequently 
emerged that in 2002, Eskom was discussing withdrawal from the project at Board level after it 
received a very luke-warm assessment of the PBMR project in a report it had commissioned from 
consultants PWC. But it was argued that withdrawal was not politically feasible. How far these 
discussions were also informed by the issues NRC were raising is not known. 
The Legal Resources Centre, on behalf of Earthlife Africa picked up on these concerns in 
September 2002 in its submissions responding to Eskom’s EIA application for authorisation to 
build a demonstration module PBMR and nuclear fuel manufacturing operation. This stated
8
: 
‘the EIR [Environmental Impact Report] understates: the temperature the PBMR could attain; the rate of 
radioisotope releases from the fuel spheres; and the risk of ignition of the core as a result of sudden 
ingress of air. The submission also argues that the EIR wrongly concludes that containment is not 
required by the ‘defense-in-depth’ principle.’ 
The South African National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) did not have a formal agreement to cooperate 
with NRC at that time, but there were informal connections and it would have been extraordinary if 
they had not followed the US process very carefully. As a newly founded regulatory body with no 
substantive experience of licensing a reactor, much less a first-of-a-kind design, they were in an 
extremely exposed position. Documents submitted by PBMR Co to the NRC were authored by 
Maurice Magugumela then an employee of PBMR Co, who, in 2005 became the CEO of the NNR. 
4. Conclusions 
Unless the results of the Jülich study can be dismissed as having no foundation, it is inconceivable 
that the PBMR project can proceed in its present form. The problems that occurred at AVR have 
been ignored despite mounting evidence, if only through the scale of decommissioning problems at 
AVR. The result is that somewhere in the region R4bn, of which more than R3.5bn is South African 
public money, has been spent developing a reactor which now seems to be decades away from 
commercial deployment. There seems strong a priori evidence that those involved in the project 
should have been aware of the issues at least from the point when NRC began to raise serious 
questions in 2002, if not earlier. A full and open public inquiry is required to determine who knew 
what and when, and why these danger signals were ignored. 
 
                                                   
7
 Energy daily, April 24, 2002. 
8 Legal Resources Centre (2002) ‘Submissions on the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and associated fuel manufacture: 
Draft environmental impact reports. Analysis of  legal compliance’ Legal Resources Centre, Cape Town, September 
2002. 
 
